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 Board Independence, Audit Quality and Earnings Management: Evidence 
from Egypt 
 
Abstract 
Using a unique data set for Egyptian firms, we investigate the relationship between board 
independence, audit quality and earnings management. We test whether firm-level corporate 
governance provisions matter in an emerging market setting characterised by weak legal 
enforcement and inadequate external discipline by the market for corporate control. Our 
results cast doubt on the notion that a higher ratio of non-executive members is associated 
with lower earnings management. We find that the effect of board independence on earnings 
management practices is contingent on the levels of ownership held by executive directors 
and large shareholders as well as the composition of audit committee composed. In addition, 
the results are consistent with the view that high quality auditors are effective in reducing 
earnings management.  
 
JEL Classification: M41, M48 
Keywords: Earnings management, board independence, audit quality, corporate governance.
1 
Board Independence, Audit Quality and Earnings Management: Evidence 
from Egypt  
1. Introduction 
It is widely believed that reporting flexibility may provide managers with a channel 
through which they can opportunistically manage earnings, which in turn may adversely 
affect the quality of reported earnings and their use in the decision making process (Xie et al. 
2003). Prior research provides several explanations as to why corporate managers may tend 
to manipulate reported earnings. The findings from this stream of research suggest that 
managers attempt to manage earnings in order to achieve one or more of contractual and 
capital market objectives such as increasing their compensation, avoiding debt covenants 
violation, smoothing the reported earnings, and meeting or exceeding analysts’ forecasts.1  
The accounting scandals surrounding several prominent large companies in the last 
decade (e.g. Enron, Xerox, Worldcom, HealthSouth, Tyco, Waste management, RiteAid and 
Subeam) raised serious concerns about the effectiveness of the monitoring and governance 
devices employed by corporations to protect investors’ interests.2 One of the corporate 
governance characteristics, which is widely viewed as desirable in mitigating costly 
managerial incentives, relates to board independence. It is argued that boards with a majority 
of independent directors in place are more effective in controlling insiders’ opportunism.  
Furthermore, to ensure that objective financial information is conveyed to 
shareholders, company boards should be composed of a sufficient number of independent 
non-executive directors who are more likely to be free from the management’s influence 
(Karamanou and Vafeas 2005). The findings of several prior studies conducted for US, UK, 
Europe firms are taken as evidence of lower levels of earnings management and fraud in 
boards in which independent directors are in the majority (Beasley 1996; Klein 2002; 
Peasnell et al. 2005; and Marra et al. 2011).  
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Audit quality is another factor perceived to be effective in detecting aggressive 
earnings management. High quality auditors require a high financial reporting quality in 
order to protect their brand name and reputation against the risk that may arise from 
misleading financial reports by clients (DeAngelo 1981; Francis  and  Wang 2008). It is 
shown that large audit firms earn considerably higher fees and use part of the audit fee 
premium to enhance their technological capability and hire skilled professionals to design and 
employ effective tools for detecting misreporting (Choi et al. 2008; Craswell et al. 1995).  
Although the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management 
has been the subject of several studies, the issues prior research considers relate generally to 
well-developed capital markets, and in particular to the US and UK in which the ownership 
of companies is well dispersed among outside shareholders and investor protection is 
relatively strong.  In contrast, few studies have directly addressed the relationship in 
emerging countries that are characterised by both highly concentrated ownership and weaker 
investor protection. In addition, there is no consensus on the importance of outside directors, 
and audit quality in reducing earnings management. It is argued that boards of publicly traded 
firms are generally passive and often dominated by weak non-executive directors who are 
charged with monitoring executives and not effective in protecting minority stockholders 
from expropriation by entrenched insiders (Holderness and Sheehan 1991; Klein 1998; Park 
and Shin 2004). Although there is evidence that a higher ratio of outside directors is 
associated with better decisions, the evidence on the relation between outside directors and 
earnings management is not clear-cut (Bradbury et al.  2006).  
The objective of this paper is to extend earlier research on earnings management by 
investigating the potential roles of board independence and audit quality as crucial 
governance mechanisms in controlling opportunistic earnings management practices in 
Egypt.  
3 
Given the significant differences in the legal and institutional factors between 
emerging countries and developed countries highlighted in previous research (see Fan and 
Wong 2002 and La Porta et al. 1999, among others), inferences from studies conducted for 
developed countries may be misleading in relation to the effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanisms. Conducting this study for Egypt therefore provides us with a 
distinct opportunity to provide further insights into the effectiveness of corporate governance 
in constraining earnings management. In contrast to an Anglo-Saxon corporate governance 
system, the key features of the corporate governance environment in Egypt include a 
significant degree of ownership concentration, weak law enforcement, and inadequate 
external discipline of the market for corporate control (Djankov et al. 2008; ROSC 2009). 
Moreover, the compliance with corporate governance codes in Egypt is generally voluntary, 
limiting the potential benefits of compliance and leaving prospective investors less protected 
and hence reluctant to invest. This in turn provides controlling shareholders and top managers 
with a greater power and a degree of discretion to manage reported earnings and choose a 
board structure that serves their interests. 
Additionally, an assumption maintained in the auditing literature is that Big Four 
auditors are associated with high audit quality because they require higher earnings quality in 
order to protect their brand name and reputation from litigation sanctions and potential risk 
arising from misleading financial reports by clients (DeAngelo 1981; Francis and Wang 
2008). The Egyptian setting provides us with an ideal opportunity to study the view that high-
quality audit firms would provide lower-quality audits when it is less likely that misreporting 
will be detected and/or litigation is unlikely to occur. 
Drawing upon a panel data of 1,005 non-financial listed Egyptian firm-year observations 
over the period 2005-2012, we find support for the notion that non-executive board directors 
and audit committee per se are not sufficient to constrain opportunistic earnings management 
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adequately. Our analysis also suggests that firms audited by high quality auditors are associated 
with a lower degree of earnings management. Specifically, we find that the impact of 
corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management varies with the levels of large 
and managerial shareholdings. At higher levels of large shareholdings and managerial 
ownership, dominant shareholders and managers attempt to reassure outside investors and 
signal their commitment to the capital market not to manage earnings. They do so, for 
example, by putting in place devices, such as appointing more outside members on the board, 
which potentially prevent the expropriation of outside investors. However, at lower levels of 
large shareholdings, adding more directors to the board may increase the communication and 
coordination problems among board directors, leading to less effective monitoring and, as a 
consequence, higher magnitude of earnings management. The results also reveal that high 
quality auditing and higher number of non-executive directors act jointly to further reduce 
earnings management. In addition, we conclude that managerial ownership (large 
shareholdings) may play a substitution monitoring role at higher ownership levels of large 
shareholders (executive directors). 
The analysis and the findings of the present study contribute to the existing literature 
in three main ways. First, using a unique (hand-collected) data set that reflects distinct 
corporate governance features and settings helps us shed additional light on the role of the 
institutional characteristics of emerging countries in explaining the relationship between 
corporate governance and earnings management. The analysis of this study also provides 
more insights into the monitoring effectiveness and the role of corporate governance 
mechanisms. Furthermore, this study addresses the question to some extent whether there is 
a universal corporate governance structure that should be followed irrespective of 
institutional and structural differences across countries. Second, our study highlights the fact 
that institutional environment and the incentives faced by managers and controlling 
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shareholders may have a greater influence in explaining the corporate governance-earnings 
management relationship. Third, the results also add to the auditing literature by providing 
evidence that high quality auditors are effective in curbing earnings management even when 
the likelihood of exposure to litigation risk is very low. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional 
setting in Egypt. Section 3 develops the hypotheses tested in the study. Section 4 discusses 
the data, the research design and sample characteristics. Section 5 provides the empirical 
results of the fixed-effects model estimation. Section 6 presents robustness checks. Finally, 
Section 7 concludes.  
2. Institutional Setting 
The Egyptian Corporate Governance Code (henceforth the Code), issued in 2005, 
emphasises the importance of inclusion of outside directors with an appropriate mix of 
technical and analytical skills on the board and its committees. For example, the Code 
requires companies listed on the Egyptian Exchange (EGX) to have an audit committee with 
at least three non-executive directors to be selected by the company’s board of directors. 
However, the Code and the Listing Rules do not impose any regulations with regard to the 
structure of other board-level committees such as nomination and remuneration committees. 
While the Company Law does not prohibit the chairperson from being the CEO, the Code 
prefers that the two positions not to be occupied by the same person. In case of the necessity 
of combining the two positions, the reasons should be explained in the corporation’s annual 
reports. Regarding board size, Egyptian companies have the discretion to determine the 
appropriate board size that fits their needs. However, according to the Company Law, boards 
must have an odd number of members, not less than three, chosen by the General Assembly 
for three years, with the exception of the first board, which is appointed by the founders for a 
maximum of five years (Bahaa El Din  and  Shawky 2005).  
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The existence of the Central Auditing Organisation (CAO) is a unique feature of 
auditing in Egypt. The CAO is an independent organisation that helps the People’s Assembly 
(Parliament) achieves control over state and public entities’ funds. The CAO exercises 
financial, performance and legal control, as well as providing opinions on the financial 
statements for publicly owned companies, other state bodies, and companies in which a 
public entity, public sector company or bank owns 25 per cent or more of the share capital. 
3. Hypotheses Development  
3.1 Board Independence and Earnings Management 
There has been considerable evidence supporting the hypothesis that the likelihood 
of fraud and earnings management is negatively related to the percentage of outside directors. 
Dechow et al. (1996) provide evidence that the percentage of outside directors on the board is 
negatively related to the likelihood of fraud and firms charged with overstating their earnings 
are more likely to have insider-dominated boards of directors. In line with this view, Beasley 
(1996) and Uzun et al. (2004) find in firms with a high proportion of outside directors that the 
likelihood of financial fraud is lower. Peasnell et al. (2005) demonstrate that the possibility 
of making income-increasing abnormal accruals to avoid reporting losses and earnings 
reductions is negatively related to the proportion of non-executive directors on the board. 
Similarly, Klein (2002) finds a negative association between the magnitude of abnormal 
accruals and the percentage of outside directors on the board. Furthermore, Carcello and 
Neal (2003) show that audit firms are unlikely to issue going-concern reports to financially 
distressed clients whose audit committees lack independence. The analysis of Klein (2002) also 
reveals that firms with boards and/or audit committees composed of less than a majority of 
independent directors are more likely to have a larger magnitude of abnormal accruals. 
Likewise, the results of Davidson et al. (2005) indicate that earnings management is lower 
when the majority on the board of directors and audit committees are non-executive 
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members. Marra et al. (2011) also demonstrate that including outside directors on the board 
and audit committee plays a crucial role in constraining earnings management after the 
mandatory application of International Financial Reporting Standards. Based on the 
discussion above, our first hypothesis is formulated as follows:  
Hypothesis 1: Earnings management is negatively related to board independence. 
We use the ratio of non-executive directors on the board, NEXECD, as a proxy for board 
independence. 
3.3. Audit Quality and Earnings Management 
It is widely believed that high audit quality is associated with less earnings 
management and higher quality of earnings. Clients of higher quality auditors are expected to 
have smaller abnormal accruals. This is because high quality auditors are more likely to 
detect aggressive earnings management and report material misreporting (Francis  and  Wang 
2008; Francis  and  Yu 2009). It is found that big audit firms with brand names are associated 
with higher quality audits (Becker et al. 1998; DeAngelo 1981; Gul et al. 2009). As they have 
more to lose in terms of clients and audit fees, high-quality-auditing firms have stronger 
incentives to reduce the risk of litigation and protect their reputations. Under this perspective, 
one would expect to observe a negative association between the magnitude of earnings 
management and audit quality.
4
 Based on the above discussion, the following hypothesis is 
formulated: 
Hypothesis 2: Earnings management is negatively related to audit quality.  
In light of the high auditing quality provided by CAO, audit quality is measured using a 
dummy variable, BIG4, that takes the value of 1 if the firm is audited by Big Four or CAO, 
and zero otherwise.  
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4. Data and Variables 
4.1. Data 
The data examined in this study are drawn from a unique data set, representing a sample 
of non-financial publicly listed companies in Egypt over the period 2005 to 2012. The 
financial statements were hand-collected from EGX and the Capital Market Authority 
(CMA). Data on ownership structure, board variables, audit committees and auditors was also 
hand-collected from Egypt for Information Dissemination (EGID) and the annual disclosure 
book issued by EGX (various issues). Market value of equity was extracted from the monthly 
and yearly bulletins issued by EGID (various issues). To be included in the sample, firms 
have to meet the following two requirements. First, firms must have sufficient data during the 
sample period to estimate the discretionary accruals. Second, firms should not be involved in 
any merger or acquisition events. Third, firms should not belong to the financial or regulated 
sectors because their disclosure requirements, accruals, generation and earnings management 
incentives are likely to be different from those of firms in other industries. Furthermore, we 
cleared outliers in the data set (on the basis of 1
st
 and the 99
th
 percentiles for each variable). 
This process yields a final sample of 1,005 firm-year observations, representing about 125 
firms over 8 years.  
4.2. Variable Measurement 
4.2.1. Earnings Management  
Drawing on prior research, this study uses discretionary accruals as a proxy for unobservable 
earnings management behaviour. The performance-adjusted discretionary accruals approach 
suggested by Kothari et al. (2005) is used to measure the discretionary accrual component. 
We measure discretionary accruals (DA) in two stages. First, we estimate non-
discretionary accruals (NDA) as a function of changes in cash revenues and the level of 
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property, plant and equipment and the lagged return on assets using the following OLS 
industry-year model:  
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)   ̂ (        ) 
where ΔREV represents the change in net revenues for firm i between years t-1 and t; ΔREC 
is the change in receivables between years t-1 and t; GPPE is gross property, plant and 
equipment; ROA is the ratio of net income before extraordinary items to total assets; TA is the 
firm i’s book value of total assets in year t,  ̂    ̂ ,  ̂ ,  ̂   are estimates of firm-specific 
parameters; and t is a time indicator. Estimates of firm-specific parameters are generated 
using the following OLS industry-year model: 
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Where ACC represents total accruals, calculated as earnings before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations minus cash flows from operating activities; and ε is the error term.  
Second, discretionary accruals are defined as: 
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We have modified the original performance-adjusted discretionary accruals model in two 
main ways. Firstly, as we have no particular event to examine, we adjust firm discretionary 
accruals by subtracting the changes in accounts receivable from the changes in revenues in 
the two stages (Teoh et al. 1998; Kasznik 1999). This is done mainly because ignoring the 
effects of receivables in the first stage is likely to reduce the power of the test (McNichols, 
2000). Furthermore, there is no reason to think that earnings management is expected to be 
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observed only in the second period (McNichols, 2000). Dechow et al. (1995) argue that it is 
easier for managers to exercise discretion over the recognition of revenue on credit sales than 
on cash sales. They also claim that when a firm does not manage earnings in the first stage 
and manages receivables in the second stage, the accruals of credit sales are normal in the 
first stage and abnormal in the second stage. Secondly, we include an intercept term without 
scaling by lagged total assets. This is because there is no theoretical reason for forcing the 
regression through the origin (Peasnell et al. 2000), or to believe that total accruals will be 
zero when changes in cash sales and gross property plant and equipment are zero.
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4.2.2. Corporate Governance and Control Variables   
Our analysis considers several corporate governance mechanisms discussed in prior studies 
that examined the earnings management-corporate governance relationship, namely, insiders’ 
ownership, board size, CEO-duality and audit committee composition. 
The literature on corporate governance offers two competing views with respect to the 
role of insiders’ ownership. On the one hand, insiders may have incentives and the ability to 
take actions that are not necessarily in line with the interests of minority investors and 
creditors.
 
The weak protection of minority shareholders may allow insiders to have influence 
over the management to misuse corporate resources, generating benefits that might not be 
shared with minority shareholders and hence leading to wealth expropriation (Dyck  and  
Zingales 2004; Thomsen et al. 2006). On the other hand, insiders may also have an interest in 
monitoring and reducing the risk of managerial opportunism (Jiraporn  and  Gleason, 2007), 
lowering the probability of earnings management. This possibly occurs due to the high costs 
of extracting benefits, which increase with ownership as insiders would bear a larger share of 
the decline in firm value resulting from opportunistic earnings manipulation. We include the 
ownership of the large shareholders, LARGHOLD, defined as the percentage of common 
equity held by the largest shareholder who owns 5 per cent or more of a firm’s ordinary 
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shares, and executives’ ownership, EXECOWN, defined as the percentage of common equity 
owned by the CEO and executives of the firm, in an attempt to capture the effects of insiders’ 
ownership on earnings management.  
A number of studies suggest that larger boards may be less effective than smaller 
boards (Jensen 1993; Lipton and Lorsch 1992). Kao and Chen (2004) show that earnings 
management is positively related to board size. Additionally, Dechow et al. (1996) find that 
board size is larger for firms engaging in earnings management than for those not engaging in 
earnings management. Xie et al. (2003) claim that small boards may be less burdened with 
bureaucratic problems and may provide better financial reporting oversight. In contrast, it is 
argued that large boards may be able to draw from a broader range of experience as they 
offer better environmental links and more expertise, help support the link between 
corporations and their environments, and provide advice on the strategic options for the firm 
(Pearce and Zahra 1992). Board size, BODSIZE, is measured by the total number of directors 
on the board. 
Under the agency framework, the ability of a firm’s board to perform its monitoring 
role is weakened when the CEO and COB positions are held by the same person, mainly due 
to the concentration of power (Beasley 1996; Jensen 1993). Managers may be more likely to 
abuse their power by engaging in fraudulent activities and taking decisions that may not be in 
the best interests of minority shareholders (Chen et al. 2006; Elsayed 2010). To capture the 
effect of CEO and COB duality, we use CEODUAL, defined as a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 if the roles of chairperson and CEO are held by the same person, and zero 
otherwise.  
Audit committee independence is also considered a vital and dominant characteristic 
for an audit committee to fulfil its oversight and monitoring role in the financial reporting. 
The non-executive directors serving on audit committees are more likely to be free from 
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management’s influence in ensuring that objective financial information is conveyed to 
shareholders (Karamanou and Vafeas 2005). It is found that firms with audit committees 
composed of less than a majority of independent directors are more likely to receive a going-
concern audit report modification (Carcello and Neal 2003), to have a larger magnitude of 
abnormal accruals (Klein 2002), and to be associated with lower levels of fraud (Beasley 
1996). To control for the possible effect of audit committees’ independence on our results, we 
incorporate in our analysis AUDCOM, defined as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
if the audit committee is composed entirely of non-executive directors, and zero otherwise, as 
a proxy for audit committee independence.
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Our analysis also includes some other control variables discussed in prior earnings 
management studies. It is found that the risk of audit failure is expected to be higher in the 
early years of tenure as incoming auditors are unlikely to have client-specific expertise and 
knowledge (Johnson et al. 2002; Jaggi  and  Leung 2007). Audit tenure, AUDTEN, defined as 
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the client-auditor relation started at least three 
years previously, and zero otherwise, is hence incorporated in order to control for the likely 
negative association found in prior studies between audit tenure and earnings management 
(e.g., Heninger 2001; Johnson et al. 2002).  
In an attempt to control for the possibility that managers may use abnormal accruals 
to increase the reported income to avoid debt covenant violation (see for example DeFond  
and  Jiambalvo 1994; and Sweeney 1994), firm leverage, LEV, measured as the ratio of total 
debt to total assets, is included in the analysis. It is also found that the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals reported by large firms is lower as they are likely to be exposed to a 
higher litigation risk, political intrusion and public pressure (Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Xie et al. 
2003), which may influence their accounting choices. We use the natural logarithm of total 
assets, SIZE, as a proxy for firm size. Following Young (1999) and Darrough et al. (1998), 
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change in cash from operations, ∆CFO, is used to account for the smoothing inherent in 
accrual generation, while SMOOTH, defined as a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when 
unmanaged earnings are above earnings benchmark, and zero otherwise, is used to account 
for the possibility of managing earnings being used to achieve earnings targets. The ratio of 
gross fixed assets to total market capitalisation, ASSINT, is used to control for the effects of 
depreciation on the estimations of discretionary accruals (Young 1998) while the absolute 
current year earnings, ABSNI, defined as the absolute value of net income scaled by lagged 
total assets, is used to control for firm performance (Frankel et al. 2002). We employ a fixed-
effects estimator to examine the impact of board independence, board size and audit quality 
on earnings management. Our specified model is as follows: 
 
                                                            
                                                            
                                                                ( )  
 
where Abs_DA is the absolute value of discretionary accruals as measured in Eq. (1). Since 
this study does not examine earnings management on a particular event and borrowing 
extensively from prior studies (see, e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Kasznik 1999; Frankel 
et al. 2002; Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Francis and Yu 2009; Gul et al. 2009), we use the absolute 
(unsigned) value of discretionary accruals as the main dependent variable in the analysis to 
capture the effects of both income increasing and decreasing adjustments.  
4.3. Sample Characteristics 
Table 1 reports summary descriptive statistics for discretionary accruals and other 
variables used in the study. The absolute value of discretionary accruals is on average 0.095 
with a median value of 0.058. The average number of directors on the board is just below 8.  
The majority of board members are non-executive directors, suggested by the average and 
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median values of the ratio of non-executive directors on the board, which are respectively 68 
and 57.1 per cent. The positions of COB and CEO are held, on average, by the same person 
in 70.4 per cent of the sample firms. Additionally, 67.2 per cent of firms have audit 
committees composed entirely of outsider members. The analysis also indicates that those 
firms that are audited by Big Four auditors represent 59 per cent of the firms in the sample. In 
addition, the average ownership by executive directors is 9.1 per cent.
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[Insert Table 1 about here] 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Univariate Analysis 
The univariate analysis includes a mean (median) comparison test of the subsamples 
of firms using t-test (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test). The samples of Abs_DA are designed on 
the basis of the median of each explanatory variable in the case of scale variables or using the 
two categories in the case of dichotomous variables. We test the hypothesis that firms with 
above median values of corporate governance characteristics, audit quality and other firm 
characteristics differ from firms with below median values with respect to the absolute value 
of discretionary accruals.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
We find that firms with above median values for BIG4, AUDTEN, SMOOTH, and ASSINT 
have relatively lower magnitudes of discretionary accruals. These results are statistically 
significant at the 1 per cent level. In addition, we find that larger firms have lower earnings 
management relative to smaller firms. The difference between the means is statistically 
significant at the 5 per cent. However, we find that firms with above median values of ABSNI 
have relatively greater extent of discretionary accruals. Contrary to our prediction, the results 
in Table 2 reveal that equity ownership levels of large shareholders and executive directors 
are not significantly associated with earnings management. In particular, it appears that firms 
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with above median executive ownership (large shareholdings) have absolute abnormal 
accruals of 0.103 (0.091), while firms with below median executive ownership (large 
shareholdings) have absolute abnormal accruals of 0.087(0.101). Additionally, there is no 
evidence that firms with larger board and in which the roles of CEO and COB are separated 
have higher earnings management relative to those with small board size and in which the 
CEO and COB positions are held by the same person. There is also weak evidence that firms 
in which audit committees are composed entirely of non-executive directors have a lower 
magnitude of earnings management. This result is statistically significant at the 10 per cent 
level. 
5.2. Multivariate Analysis 
The results of univariate analysis reveal a weak association between the majority of 
board characteristics, audit quality and earnings management. The univariate analysis, 
however, does not control for the effects of other variables that may be related to abnormal 
accruals and/or corporate governance mechanisms. The potential relation may in turn 
confound the earnings management-corporate governance relationship. Accordingly, the rest 
of the empirical results are derived from multivariate analysis. 
5.2.1. Board Independence, Audit Quality and Earnings Management 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Table 3 reports the results of the absolute value of discretionary accruals tests using a 
fixed-effects estimation methodology with robust standard errors to correct for 
heteroskedasticity. In contrast to our expectations, the results in Table 3 reveal that the 
estimated coefficient of NEXECD is not significant, implying that non-executive directors in 
general play no monitoring role in the earnings management reduction. One plausible 
explanation is that non-executive directors are added to the board for their advisory duties 
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such as special expertise and contracts or merely to comply with regulations (Peasnell et al. 
2003; Siregar and Utama 2008), rather than their monitoring function. The results in Table 3 
show that the coefficient of AUDCOM is negative and statistically significant at the 5 per 
cent level. This result suggests that firms with audit committees composed solely of non-
executive directors are less likely to undertake earnings manipulation activities. 
As the likelihood of the litigation risk that audit firms might face is low in Egypt 
(Fawzy 2003; Sourial 2004), one would expect no differences between the quality of auditing 
provided by Big Four and non-Big Four. However, the estimated coefficient of BIG4 is 
highly significant and negatively associated with earnings managements at the 1 per cent 
level. This result is in line with the view that firms audited by Big Four auditors are unlikely 
to engage in earnings management practices due to the higher quality of auditing provided by 
those auditors (e.g., Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999).  
The findings in Table 3 also show that firms with higher managerial ownership and 
large shareholdings are likely to have a lower magnitude of earnings management. This is 
possibly because top managers at higher ownership levels are less likely to engage in value-
destroying activities such as opportunistic earnings management. Furthermore, the results in 
Table 3 reveal that the coefficient of BODSIZE is negative and significant at the 5 per cent 
level or better. This result suggests that a large board is more effective in reducing earnings 
management. This is possibly because larger boards may benefit from greater representations 
of outsiders on the board and audit committees and increase the diversity of different 
expertise which presumably leads to less earnings management (Cheng 2008; Klein 2002; 
Xie et al. 2003). 
Turning to other variables, the estimated coefficient of CEODUAL is positive and 
significant at the 5 per cent level. This result is in line with the agency argument that CEO 
duality is likely to weaken the firm’s board monitoring role. The results in Model (5) indicate 
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that the coefficients of several control variables are significantly associated with the 
magnitude of earnings management at the 5 per cent level or better with their expected signs 
where the exceptions are the estimated coefficients of LEV and ∆CFO, which are not 
significant. The leverage result is inconsistent with the view that firms with debt covenants 
may have greater incentives to disguise the firm’s economic performance and inflate reported 
earnings to prevent debt covenants violation (e.g., Healy and Palepu 1990; and DeFond and 
Jiambalvo 1994). However, this result is in line with the assertion that highly leveraged firms 
are unlikely to make income increasing accounting choices in an attempt to reduce the 
possibility of default (see, e.g., DeAngelo et al. 1994; and Heflin et al. 2002). Using a sample 
of Egyptian firms, Khalil and Simon (2014) find no evidence that supports the assertion that 
managers of highly leveraged firms are likely to manipulate abnormal accruals upward to 
increase the reported income to prevent debt covenant violation. They find that income 
smoothing objective is dominant in the Egyptian setting. As Table 4 shows that the estimated 
coefficient of SMOOTH is negative and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, it 
seems that earnings smoothing is more likely help management to achieve contractual 
objectives, including avoid debt covenant violation, and/or gain personal advantage. This also 
helps management keep their jobs (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995), increase their compensation, 
and reduce the probability of governmental intervention. Equally, it can help management 
signal their ability to the capital market and build their reputation. Thus, the weak evidence of 
leverage might be captured by the strong effects of income smoothing.  
Furthermore, ASSINT is marginally significant at the 10 per cent with a sign different 
than expected while SIZE is significant at the 5 per cent level. It also seems that firms with 
longer audit tenure have lower earnings management. More specifically, the estimated 
coefficient of AUDTEN is negative and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. 
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5.2.2. The Intervening Effect of Large Shareholdings, Executives’ Ownership, and Audit 
Committee Independence  
The conclusion from the above results is that the role of board characteristics in reducing 
earning management is not significant. However, we believe that the monitoring role of non-
executive directors in Egypt is more likely to be contingent on the equity ownership levels of 
large shareholders and executive directors. The premise underpinning our argument is that in 
a setting characterised by weak legal protection of shareholders, dominant owners may have 
different incentives at various levels of ownership. At lower levels of ownership large 
shareholders and top management may tend to expropriate firm resources to their personal 
consumption by taking self-interested actions that may not necessarily be optimal for other 
shareholders. These actions include, for example, managing the reported earnings 
aggressively and choosing weak boards. However, greater levels of ownership can be seen as 
a governance mechanism that helps prevent the potential expropriation of minority 
shareholders. Thus, at higher levels of equity ownership, controlling shareholders and/or 
powerful managers may tend to reduce opportunistic earnings management as they would 
bear a larger share of the decline in firm value resulting from opportunistic earnings 
management.  
The above argument potentially suggests that the structure and the monitoring role of 
the board and audit quality are likely to interact with and be shaped by the equity ownership 
of large and executives shareholders. Thus, it would be useful to test the extent to which the 
ownership of large and executive shareholders, as well as audit quality, interact to reduce or 
exacerbate the magnitude of earnings management. Such analysis is likely to provide 
additional insights into the conditional monitoring roles of corporate governance in a country 
with weak legal protection of shareholders. To do so, we first split the full sample into two 
sub-samples based upon the level of the median value of ownership of large shareholders.  
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[Insert Table 4 about here] 
At lower levels of large shareholdings, Table 4 shows that the NEXECD coefficient is 
significantly positive at the 5 per cent level. This result reflects an important feature of the 
Egyptian setting. Although the majority of board members are on average from non-
executive directors, existing voting rules entitle the controlling owners to elect members to 
represent dominant shareholders’ interests. It is found that the majority of Egyptian board 
members is usually chosen from family, close relatives and friends (Sourial 2004). This is no 
doubt due to the absence of cumulative voting that enables minority shareholders to elect 
their representative on the board. This, in turn, is more likely to lead to weak boards whose 
members lack financial knowledge and facilitate resource expropriation, enabling large 
shareholders to enjoy private benefits that are not shared with other shareholders. 
Presumably, the weak Egyptian legal protection of minority shareholders allows controlling 
shareholders to benefit from corporate resource expropriation via, for example, earnings 
management to obtain more private benefits if they believe that these benefits outweigh the 
costs of extracting such benefits. In addition, large shareholders may exaggerate the capital 
market pressure in the short-term by managing the reported earnings in order to meet 
earnings targets (e.g., Guthrie  and  Sokolowsky 2010). Thus, weak boards are likely to be the 
preferred choice of dominant shareholders, which enable them to act in their own best 
interests by exploiting minority shareholders.  
At lower level of large shareholdings, the Big Four do not seem to play a significant 
role in constraining earnings management, suggested by the insignificantly estimated 
coefficient of BIG4. With respect to the impact of managerial ownership, the results in Table 
4 suggest that executive ownership may act jointly as effective governance mechanisms to 
curtail opportunistic behaviour of dominant shareholders at lower levels of ownership. In 
addition, the estimated coefficient of BODSIZE (NEXCED) is positive and significant at the 
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10 (5) per cent level. We argue that while larger boards might lead to a greater representation 
of outsiders, and hence provide the CEO with better advice (Coles et al. 2008), adding more 
directors to the board is more likely to increase the coordination and communication 
problems as well as the director free-rider problem related to larger boards (Fama and Jensen 
1983; and Jensen 1993). These results suggest that large shareholders may use their voting 
power to appoint directors who serve to provide expertise and advice rather than for 
monitoring purposes possibly due to higher monitoring costs. 
However, it seems that other board characteristics, namely CEO duality and audit 
committee independence, play no role in reducing earnings manipulation. This is possibly 
because managerial ownership may provide a sufficient monitoring role of opportunistic 
earnings manipulation at higher ownership levels of large shareholders.  
Arguably, at higher levels of large shareholder ownership, the results in Table 4 
suggest that the monitoring role of outside directors becomes effective as the coefficient of 
NEXECD is negative and significant at the 1 per cent level. Presumably at such higher 
ownership levels, outside shareholders may expect that earnings management can be used as 
a mean of resource diversion, and they are more likely to protect their interests by, for 
example, paying a lower price for firm shares. This is in turn likely to have adverse effects on 
the firm value and on the wealth of managers and large shareholders. As a result, dominant 
shareholders tend to signal their commitment to outsiders to refrain from the diversion of the 
firm’s resources to serve their own interests by putting in place effective credible devices, 
such as adding more outside members to the board. This might be an important part of a 
broader strategy that improves their transparency if improved transparency allows them, for 
example, to access external capital at a lower cost or facilitates cross-listing (Gopalan and 
Jayaraman 2012). Doing so may reduce the diversion of corporate resources, enhance firm 
value and, thereby, increases the wealth of dominant shareholders.  
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The results in Table 4 point to possible complementary monitoring roles at higher 
levels of large shareholdings between high audit quality and a greater representation of non-
executive directors on the board to reduce earnings management. Put differently, firms with a 
high percentage of large shareholders, high quality audits and non-executive directors on the 
board possibly work jointly to provide protection against opportunistic earning management. 
In a similar manner, we split the sample based on executives’ ownerships at the 10 per 
cent level. Similar to the results reported above, Table 4, at greater levels of executive 
directors’ ownership, reveals that the coefficient of NEXED becomes more significant. Since 
they would bear a larger share of diversion costs, top management is less likely to take sub-
optimal decisions or consume perquisites to deviate from shareholder wealth maximisation to 
gain more private benefits (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Thus, managers may seek to add 
more non-executive directors to the board in an attempt to protect their interest and signal the 
commitment not to divert corporate resources to themselves and/or to the dominant owners. 
The results also may indicate a possible incentive alignment between the interest of 
management and that of minority shareholders.  
Similar to the complementary role explained above, high quality auditors are more 
likely to detect aggressive earnings management when the monitoring by executives and 
dominant shareholders is inadequate. In Table 4 (columns 7 and 8), we examine the 
interactions between board characteristics and audit quality and audit committee 
independence. The results suggest that high quality auditors and non-executive directors work 
jointly to reduce earnings management when audit committee is composed entirely of outside 
directors. That is, adding more non-executive directors to the boards is more effective in 
reducing earnings management. This is possibly because additional outsiders are likely to 
lead to strong boards and better governance practices and, as a result, lower earnings 
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management. In addition, high quality auditors are associated with lower earnings 
management. 
5.2.2 The Impact of Global Financial Crisis on Corporate Governance-Earnings 
Management Relationship  
Recent research shows that financial reporting did not adequately monitor and disclose the 
influence of risk-taking on financial statements (e.g., Barth and Landsman 2010; Magnan and 
Markarian 2011). Thus, we acknowledge that the effectiveness of corporate governance in 
reducing earnings management activities may depend on the period especially in relation to 
the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. A number of studies provide supportive evidence to 
the assertion that senior managers are more likely to manage reported earnings aggressively 
during the financial crisis in an attempt to meet or beat earnings targets and hence influence 
the market’s evaluation of the survival of their firms (Matsumoto 2002; Kasznik and 
McNichols 2002; and Bartov et al. 2002). However, another strand of research suggests that 
financially distressed firms are unlikely to engage earnings management. This is because 
aggressive earnings management practices are costly in terms of the loss of management’s 
reputation, legal responsibility of managers, and other penalties regulators and auditors can 
impose on the firm. Given the weak legal enforcement and inadequate external discipline by 
the market for corporate control in the Egyptian setting, we expect that corporate governance 
mechanisms will play negligible or no role in constraining earnings management during the 
financial crisis. To test this prediction, we run regression models by dividing the sample 
period into three sub-periods, namely the pre-crisis period (i.e., 2005-2006), the crisis period 
(i.e., 2007-2008), and the post-crisis period (i.e., 2009-2012). Table 5 reports the results 
related to the three periods. 
 [Insert Table 5 about here] 
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As we can see from the table, the coefficient of BIG4 is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1 per cent level. This result indicates that Big Four auditors provide an 
effective governance mechanism against earnings manipulation over the three periods. In 
addition, managerial ownership seems to play an effective role only in the pre-crisis and post-
crisis periods. More specifically, the coefficient of EXECOOWN is negative and statistically 
significant at the 5 (10) per cent in the pre- (post-) crisis period. However, there is no 
effective role for managerial and large shareholders ownership and board characteristics 
during the crisis period. These results possibly are consistent with the argument that, when 
the overall economy is down, managers are more likely to prefer accounting choices that 
enhance firm’s profitability and survival (Graham et al. 2005). There is also evidence that 
adding more outside directors to audit committees may exacerbate earnings management 
activities during the crisis period.  
We also partitioned the sample based on the ownership levels of managers and large 
shareholders and whether an audit committee is composed entirely of non-executive directors 
to test the conditional role of board independence and audit quality.
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Overall, we find 
supportive evidence for the argument that firms audited by Big Four are less likely to engage 
in earnings manipulation at higher ownership levels and when an audit committee is 
composed entirely of independent directors. However, the role is more pronounced during the 
pre-crisis and post-crisis periods than the crisis period. As discussed earlier, this reduced role 
of audit function is possibly due to the absence of the complementary roles of other 
governance mechanisms (Magnan and Markarian 2011). Interestingly, we find that, at higher 
levels of large shareholdings and managerial ownership, a greater representation of non-
executive directors on the board and audit committee exacerbates earnings management 
activities during the financial crisis. Thus, the results suggest that large shareholders and 
managers are likely to prefer weak boards whose directors lack sufficient backgrounds 
24 
(Magnan and Markarian 2011), leading to higher earnings management. Management may 
prefer weak boards over strong ones to enhance firm’s profitability and boost future earnings 
prospects possibly until the economy recovers. 
6. Robustness Checks  
It is widely believed that it is easier for managers to manipulate current accruals 
relative to non-working capital accruals as they can exercise more discretion over the choice 
of regular revenue and expense items (DeFond  and  Jiambalvo, 1994). To test the sensitivity 
of the results after excluding depreciation, our regression is re-examined using the current 
discretionary accruals. The results are qualitatively similar to those documented earlier. 
Arguably, it is also possible that the results reported above result from the abnormality of 
absolute value of discretionary accruals. To correct for this possibility, the natural logarithm 
of discretionary accruals is used as a dependent variable. Our inferences drawn earlier do not 
change and the results are qualitatively similar to those found earlier. 
Hribar and Nichols (2007) demonstrate that using absolute discretionary accruals as a 
proxy for earnings management might bias tests for rejecting the null hypothesis of no 
earnings management. Against the concern that the prior results might be driven by the usage 
of the unsigned discretionary accruals, the sample is partitioned into two subsamples based 
upon the sign of discretionary accruals, resulting in a Pos_DA subsample, which includes 
firms with positive discretionary accruals and a Neg_DA subsample which includes those 
with negative discretionary accruals. We find that Big Four auditors are effective in 
monitoring both income-increasing and income-decreasing accruals alike although they are 
more effective with regard to income-increasing than income-decreasing accruals. However, 
adding non-executive directors is not related to positive or negative accruals.  
In order to test the possibility that the relation between executive ownership as well as 
large shareholdings and earnings management is non-linear, the regression are re-estimated 
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after including the squared term of executives and large equity ownership. The results show 
no indication of such a non-linear relationship. Additionally, the sample is partitioned 
according to the median value of firm size. The results indicate that non-executive directors 
(Big Four auditors) play an in(effective) role in reducing earnings management irrespective 
of the firm size. In addition, executive ownership does not seem important in reducing 
earnings management in small firms.  
Despite the careful treatment of the variables used in the analysis and the 
methodology adopted, the results of this study are subject to some caveats. First, as in any 
accruals-based earnings management study, a key issue regarding the explanation of results 
concerns the ability of earnings management proxies to adequately capture earnings 
manipulation activities. It is well-known that measurement errors related to abnormal 
accruals measurement are of a concern. Although alternative discretionary accruals models 
and different measurement error-related variables are used, the findings are still not totally 
free of this concern. Second, the classification of directors to executive and non-executive 
directors is based on the information available in the financial reports of sample firms and 
that collected from the EGID. Accordingly, the reliability of this information depends in turn 
upon the reliability of its sources. Third, the corporate governance variables used in the 
empirical analysis are treated as exogenous. However, it is possible that the discretionary 
accruals and some of those variables are endogenously determined. Finally, it is worth noting 
that board monitoring and audit quality are only limited dimensions of corporate governance 
that could be used as effective mechanisms to constrain opportunistic earnings management. 
Therefore, ignoring other corporate dimensions could cause a correlated omitted variable 
problem if these dimensions (such as financial literacy of outside members, number of board 
meetings, number of audit committees’ meetings) are correlated to those included in the 
analysis. 
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7. Concluding Remarks 
This study investigates the monitoring and disciplining roles of board independence 
and audit quality in constraining opportunistic earnings management in Egypt characterised 
by high ownership concentration and weak shareholder protection. Using a sample of 1,005 
non-financial Egyptian firm-year observations over the period 2005 to 2012, we find support for 
the notion that increasing the ratio of non-executive directors on the firm’s board of directors 
or its audit committee may not be enough to adequately constrain opportunistic earnings 
management. This evidence is inconsistent with the view that greater representation of non-
executive directors on the board is likely to be associated with stronger monitoring and hence 
lower earnings management. We also find that the impact of the presence of non-executive 
directors on earnings management is likely to be contingent on the ownership levels of large 
shareholders and managers. Our explanation for this interaction is that at higher levels of 
ownership large shareholders and managers attempt to signal their commitment to the wider 
public not to manipulate earnings opportunistically by putting in place good corporate 
governance practices, including the appointment of more outside members on the board. We 
also demonstrate that firms audited by high quality auditors are associated with lower 
magnitude of earnings management. 
Our findings also show that corporate governance mechanisms are unlikely to act in 
isolation. At higher ownership levels of large shareholders, high quality auditing acts jointly 
with non-executive directors to further reduce earnings management while managerial 
ownership plays an effective monitoring role in reduce opportunistic earnings management 
when ownership levels of large shareholders is low. The result at lower ownership levels 
large shareholders suggests a possible substitution role between executives’ ownership and 
large shareholdings. In a similar vein, non-executive directors and high quality auditing act 
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together to further reduce earnings management when managerial ownership is high and audit 
committee is composed entirely of non-executive directors. 
The findings of our study should be of substantial interest of regulators and policy 
makers emerging countries and highlights the fact that there is no a unique and universal 
corporate governance system that fits all and that the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate 
governance may not always be the optimal to follow. Thus, each country should design its 
corporate governance code in a way that matches its institutional, legal and political needs. 
Our results oppose the conventional wisdom that greater representation of non-executive 
directors on the board is necessarily associated with lower earnings management. The results 
also reveal that much of the weakness related to corporate governance in emerging countries 
may result from the inadequate enforcement of the law and the weak legal protection of 
minority shareholders. In the Egyptian context, there is a need to put more emphasis on 
proper enforcement that protects minority shareholders’ rights, such as adopting cumulative 
voting to give minority shareholders the chance to elect their representative. 
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Notes 
1. See Fields et al. (2001) and Dechow et al. (2010) for a survey of research. 
2. See Jones (2011), for examples of accounting scandals across developed and 
developing countries.  
3. Throughout the paper, the terms dominant shareholders, controlling shareholders, 
blockholders, and large shareholders are used interchangeably. 
4. The choice of auditor is treated as an exogenous variable and we test whether the 
level of discretionary accruals is lower for firms associated with high-quality auditors. 
5. We have also run our analysis using the discretionary accruals after scaling the 
intercept scaling by lagged total assets, with essentially qualitatively similar results. 
6. In unreported results, our conclusion remains unchanged if the regression models are 
extended to include institutional and non-executive directors’ ownership. 
Furthermore, the rationale behind the strict metric of audit committee independence is 
that most firms in our sample have audit committees with a majority of non-executive 
members.  
7. It is evident that relatively high correlations among some explanatory variables raise 
econometric concern about the possible impact of collinearity on the drawn 
inferences. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores and condition indices are calculated 
to ensure that the sample did not suffer from possible harmful collinearity. Belsley et 
al. (1980) suggest that a condition index greater than 15 signifies a possible problem 
and in excess of 30 suggests potentially severe collinearity among the explanatory 
variables. Since the highest VIF score (1.56) is less than 10 and the condition indices 
are less than 15, multicollinearity is not a problem in this study. 
8. These results are not reported for the sake of brevity, but are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min. Q1 Median Q3 Max. 
Abs_DA   0.095 0.144 0.000 0.027 0.058 0.110 2.083 
NEXECD  0.680 0.215 0.000 0.571 0.750 0.833 1.000 
BODSIZE 7.755 2.745 3.000 5.000 7.000 9.000 17.000 
EXECOWN 0.091 0.207 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.079 1.000 
LARGHOLD 0.452 0.260 0.000 0.240 0.418 0.600 0.997 
LEV 0.126 0.198 0.000 0.001 0.049 0.197 3.365 
SIZE 13.062 1.624 9.057 12.037 12.985 13.943 18.675 
∆CFO 0.077 2.078 -2.037 -0.050 0.008 0.072 1.326 
ABSDNI 0.115 0.147 0.000 0.036 0.081 0.149 2.405 
ASSINT 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.034 
Dichotomous Variables  0 1 
BIG4    413 (41.0%) 592 (59.0%) 
CEODUAL    297 (29.6%) 708 (70.4%) 
AUDCOM     330 (32.8%) 675 (67.2%) 
AUDTEN    141 (14.0%) 864 (86.0%) 
SMOOTH    459 (45.7%) 546 (54.3%) 
 
Source: Developed by the authors. 
Notes: This table shows the descriptive statistics for 1005 observations used in the analyses over the period 
2005-2012. Abs_DA  = the absolute value of discretionary accruals as measured by the performance-
adjusted discretionary accruals approach, NEXECD = the percentage of non-executive directors on the 
board, BIG4 = a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the company is audited by Big Four or 
Central Auditing Organisation (CAO) auditors, and zero otherwise, BODSIZE = the total number of 
directors on the board, EXECOWN = the percentage of common equity owned by the CEO and 
executives of the firm, LARGHOLD = the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder who 
owns 5 per cent or more of a firm’s ordinary shares, CEODUAL = a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the roles of chairperson and CEO are held by the same person, and zero otherwise, 
AUDCOM = a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the audit committee is composed  entirely of 
non-executive directors, and zero otherwise, AUDTEN = a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the client-auditor relation started at least three years previously, and zero otherwise, LEV = the ratio of 
total debt to total assets, SIZE = natural logarithm of end-year book value of total assets of firm in 
million (Egyptian) pounds, ∆CFO = change in cash from operations as measured by cash from 
operating activities in the current year less cash from operating activities in the prior year, scaled by 
lagged total assets, SMOOTH = a dummy variable defined as the difference between pre-managed 
earnings, measured as reported earnings minus discretionary accruals generated from different 
discretionary accruals models, and firm’s earnings benchmark, measured as firm earnings in the prior 
year, taking the value of 1 when pre-managed earnings are above earnings benchmark, and zero 
otherwise, ASSINT= the ratio of gross fixed assets to total market capitalisation, ABSDNI = the 
absolute value of net income scaled by lagged total assets. 
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Table 2. Univariate Results 
 Abs_DA  mean of 
above variable median 
Abs_DA  mean of 
below variable median 
t-test Mann-
Whitney 
NEXECD  0.101 0.087  1.578  1.221 
BIG4 0.081 0.112 -3.393*** -2.797*** 
EXECOWN 0.103 0.091 -1.142 -1.304 
BODSIZE 0.100 0.085 -1.548 -0.578 
CEODUAL 0.094 0.102  1.183  1.95 
AUDCOM  0.100 0.083 -1.740* -1.766* 
LARGHOLD 0.087 0.101  1.615  1.475 
AUDTEN 0.083 0.161 -6.125*** -4.098*** 
LEV 0.093 0.095  0.267  0.302 
SIZE 0.084 0.104 -2.253** -3.500*** 
∆CFO 0.098 0.091 -0.730 -1.165 
SMOOTH 0.132 0.080 -5.116*** -7.772*** 
ASSINT 0.075 0.105 -3.238*** -2.218** 
ABSNI 0.111 0.077  3.449***  3.753*** 
 
Notes: This table reports mean comparisons of absolute value of performance-adjusted discretionary total 
accruals analysing high (above median) versus low (below median) board characteristics, audit quality 
and other firm characteristics. t-test and Mann-Whitney statistics are used to compare the mean 
difference. ***, ** and * indicate that the mean difference is statistically significant at the 1 per cent, 5 
per cent and 10 per cent level respectively. 
NEXECD = the percentage of non-executive directors on the board, BIG4 = a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the company is audited by Big Four or Central Auditing Organisation (CAO) 
auditors, and zero otherwise, BODSIZE = the total number of directors on the board, EXECOWN = the 
percentage of common equity owned by the CEO and executives of the firm, LARGHOLD = the 
percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder who owns 5 per cent or more of a firm’s ordinary 
shares, CEODUAL = a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the roles of chairperson and CEO 
are held by the same person, and zero otherwise, AUDCOM = a dummy variable that takes the value of 
1 if the audit committee is composed  entirely of non-executive directors, and zero otherwise, 
AUDTEN = a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the client-auditor relation started at least 
three years previously, and zero otherwise, LEV = the ratio of total debt to total assets, SIZE = natural 
logarithm of end-year book value of total assets of firm in million (Egyptian) pounds, ∆CFO = change 
in cash from operations as measured by cash from operating activities in the current year less cash from 
operating activities in the prior year, scaled by lagged total assets, SMOOTH = a dummy variable 
defined as the difference between pre-managed earnings, measured as reported earnings minus 
discretionary accruals generated from different discretionary accruals models, and firm’s earnings 
benchmark, measured as firm earnings in the prior year, taking the value of 1 when pre-managed 
earnings are above earnings benchmark, and zero otherwise, ASSINT= the ratio of gross fixed assets to 
total market capitalisation, ABSDNI = the absolute value of net income scaled by lagged total assets.  
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Table 3. Fixed-Effects Estimation Showing the Impact of Board Independence, Audit Quality on 
Earnings Management 
 Pred. Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant +/-   0.378**  0.365**  0.376**  0.346**   0.335** 
   (2.16) (2.05) (2.16) (1.96)  (1.98) 
NEXECD -   0.016    -0.023 
   (0.38)   (-0.54) 
BIG4 -    -0.040***  -0.029*** 
     (-3.31) (-2.95) 
EXECOWN +/-  -0.113**  -0.113**  -0.110**  -0.117**  -0.114** 
  (-2.21) (-2.22) (-2.17) (-2.30) (-2.24) 
LARGHOLD +/-  -0.230*  -0.229*  -0.201  -0.242*  -0.248** 
  (-1.66) (-1.65) (-1.45) (-1.74) (-1.99) 
BODSIZE -    -0.009**   -0.008** 
    (-2.24)  (-2.11) 
CEODUAL +   0.033**  0.034**   0.028*   0.033**   0.029** 
   (2.32) (2.35)  (1.95)  (2.33)  (2.02) 
AUDCOM -  -0.083  -0.083  -0.099*  -0.086**  -0.101** 
  (-1.64) (-1.65) (-1.94) (-1.96) (-1.98) 
AUDTEN -  -0.082***  -0.082***  -0.084***  -0.092***  -0.092*** 
  (-3.38) (-3.39) (-3.47) (-3.62) (-3.62) 
LEV +   0.000  0.001   0.006   0.001   0.003 
   (0.01) (0.03)  (0.23)  (0.05)  (0.11) 
SIZE -  -0.024*  -0.024*  -0.020  -0.023*  -0.019 
  (-1.91) (-1.90) (-1.56) (-1.81) (-1.49) 
∆CFO -  -0.000  -0.001  -0.001  -0.000  -0.000 
  (-0.02) (-0.03) (-0.03) (-0.01) (-0.02) 
SMOOTH -  -0.061*** -0.061***  -0.061***  -0.060***  -0.061*** 
  (-6.24) (-6.23) (-6.32) (-6.21) (-6.28) 
ASSINT +  -2.965*  -3.003*  -2.848*  -3.238*  -3.110* 
  (-1.78) (-1.80) (-1.71) (-1.93) (-1.85) 
ABSNI +   0.391***   0.392***   0.387***   0.391***   0.388*** 
  (13.41) (13.41) (13.27) (13.42) (13.28) 
Time dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 1005 1005 1005 1005 1005 
Adj. R
2
    0.2191   0.2205   0.2184   0.2269   0.2285 
 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significant at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 
per cent levels, respectively. For the estimation, the consistent to heteroskedasticity standard errors has 
been used.  
NEXECD = the percentage of non-executive directors on the board, BIG4 = a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the company is audited by Big Four or Central Auditing Organisation (CAO) 
auditors, and zero otherwise, BODSIZE = the total number of directors on the board, EXECOWN = the 
percentage of common equity owned by the CEO and executives of the firm, LARGHOLD = the 
percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder who owns 5 per cent or more of a firm’s ordinary 
shares, CEODUAL = a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the roles of chairperson and CEO 
are held by the same person, and zero otherwise, AUDCOM = a dummy variable that takes the value of 
1 if the audit committee is composed entirely of non-executive directors, and zero otherwise, AUDTEN 
= a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the client-auditor relation started at least three years 
previously, and zero otherwise, LEV = the ratio of total debt to total assets, SIZE = natural logarithm of 
end-year book value of total assets of firm in million (Egyptian) pounds, ∆CFO = change in cash from 
operations as measured by cash from operating activities in the current year less cash from operating 
activities in the prior year, scaled by lagged total assets, SMOOTH = a dummy variable defined as the 
difference between pre-managed earnings, measured as reported earnings minus discretionary accruals 
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generated from different discretionary accruals models, and firm’s earnings benchmark, measured as 
firm earnings in the prior year, taking the value of 1 when pre-managed earnings are above earnings 
benchmark, and zero otherwise, ASSINT= the ratio of gross fixed assets to total market capitalisation, 
ABSDNI = the absolute value of net income scaled by lagged total assets. 
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Table 4. Fixed-Effects Estimation Showing the Impact of Board Independence, Audit Quality on 
Earnings Management Partitioned by Large Shareholdings, Executives’ Ownership and Audit 
Committee’ Independence.  
 
 Pred 
Sign 
LARGHOLD EXECOWN AUDCOM 
 above 
median 
below 
median 
≥ 0.10 < 0.10 = 1 = 0 
Constant +/-   0.560**    0.390    0.592   0.748***    0.295   0.566* 
   (2.11)   (1.33)   (1.25)  (4.08)   (1.51)  (1.90) 
NEXECD -  -0.036***    0.025**   -0.097***  -0.006   -0.045**  -0.063 
  (-2.69)   (2.06)  (-2.78) (-0.72)  (-2.08) (-1.09) 
BIG4 -  -0.024***   -0.004   -0.039***  -0.006   -0.050***  -0.008 
  (-2.30)  (-0.48)  (-2.42) (-0.18)  (-2.69) (-0.26) 
EXECOWN +/-  -0.074   -0.123**     -0.081**  -0.166 
  (-0.82)  (-2.03)    (-1.97) (-0.87) 
LARGHOLD +/-     -0.100  -0.392***   -0.285*   0.114 
     (-0.22) (-2.85)  (-1.87)  (0.48) 
BODSIZE -  -0.001    0.012*   -0.010  -0.002   -0.004  -0.009 
  (-0.21)   (1.65)  (-0.95) (-0.61)  (-1.00) (-1.12) 
CEODUAL +   0.017    0.025    0.033   0.017    0.033*   0.011 
   (0.85)   (0.92)   (0.60)  (1.21)   (1.93)  (0.49) 
AUDCOM -   0.123    0.065    0.116   0.058   
   (1.04)   (0.90)   (1.00)  (1.08)   
AUDTEN -  -0.086**   -0.038   -0.035  -0.112***   -0.133***  -0.041 
  (-2.41)  (-0.98)  (-0.61) (-4.12)  (-4.61) (-0.84) 
LEV +   0.037    0.026    0.043   0.024    0.001   0.021 
   (0.86)   (0.77)   (0.46)  (0.98)   (0.04)  (0.65) 
SIZE -  -0.037**   -0.013   -0.039  -0.044***   -0.014  -0.036* 
  (-1.99)  (-0.69)  (-1.23) (-3.36)  (-0.97) (-1.77) 
∆CFO -   0.009   -0.009    0.080**  -0.012  -0.053**   0.087** 
   (0.33)  (-0.30)   (2.03) (-0.61)  (-2.52)  (2.59) 
SMOOTH -  -0.056***   -0.051***   -0.059***  -0.057***   -0.075***  -0.046*** 
  (-4.55)  (-3.29)  (-2.92) (-5.62)  (-7.12) (-2.85) 
ASSINT +  -3.705   -1.403   -1.005   6.042***    0.089  -7.704*** 
  (-1.51)  (-0.56)  (-0.29)  (3.44)   (0.05) (-2.99) 
ABSNI +   0.208***    0.427***    0.913***   0.111***    0.696***   0.006 
   (3.23) (12.03)  (16.35)  (3.37) (19.72)  (0.15) 
Time dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 503 502 233 772 675 330 
Adj. R
2
    0.2757   0.1127   0.6437   0.1916   0.4790   0.1220 
 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significant at the 10%, 5per cent and 1per cent 
levels, respectively. For the estimation, the consistent to heteroskedasticity standard errors has been 
used.  
NEXECD = the percentage of non-executive directors on the board, BIG4 = a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the company is audited by Big Four or Central Auditing Organisation (CAO) 
auditors, and zero otherwise, BODSIZE = the total number of directors on the board, EXECOWN = the 
percentage of common equity owned by the CEO and executives of the firm, LARGHOLD = the 
percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder who owns 5 per cent or more of a firm’s ordinary 
shares, CEODUAL = a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the roles of chairperson and CEO 
are held by the same person, and zero otherwise, AUDCOM = a dummy variable that takes the value of 
1 if the audit committee is composed entirely of non-executive directors, and zero otherwise, AUDTEN 
= a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the client-auditor relation started at least three years 
previously, and zero otherwise, LEV = the ratio of total debt to total assets, SIZE = natural logarithm of 
end-year book value of total assets of firm in million (Egyptian) pounds, ∆CFO = change in cash from 
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operations as measured by cash from operating activities in the current year less cash from operating 
activities in the prior year, scaled by lagged total assets, SMOOTH = a dummy variable defined as the 
difference between pre-managed earnings, measured as reported earnings minus discretionary accruals 
generated from different discretionary accruals models, and firm’s earnings benchmark, measured as 
firm earnings in the prior year, taking the value of 1 when pre-managed earnings are above earnings 
benchmark, and zero otherwise, ASSINT= the ratio of gross fixed assets to total market capitalisation, 
ABSDNI = the absolute value of net income scaled by lagged total assets. 
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Table 5. Regression estimation Showing the Impact of  Board Independence, Audit Quality on Earnings 
Management pre-, during and post-crisis period 
 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significant at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 
per cent levels, respectively. For the estimation, the consistent to heteroskedasticity standard errors has 
been used.  
NEXECD = the percentage of non-executive directors on the board, BIG4 = a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the company is audited by Big Four or Central Auditing Organisation (CAO) 
auditors, and zero otherwise, BODSIZE = the total number of directors on the board, EXECOWN = the 
percentage of common equity owned by the CEO and executives of the firm, LARGHOLD = the 
percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder who owns 5 per cent or more of a firm’s ordinary 
shares, CEODUAL = a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the roles of chairperson and CEO 
are held by the same person, and zero otherwise, AUDCOM = a dummy variable that takes the value of 
1 if the audit committee is composed entirely of non-executive directors, and zero otherwise, AUDTEN 
= a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the client-auditor relation started at least three years 
previously, and zero otherwise, LEV = the ratio of total debt to total assets, SIZE = natural logarithm of 
end-year book value of total assets of firm in million (Egyptian) pounds, ∆CFO = change in cash from 
operations as measured by cash from operating activities in the current year less cash from operating 
activities in the prior year, scaled by lagged total assets, SMOOTH = a dummy variable defined as the 
 Pred. Sign Pre-crisis Crisis period Post-crisis 
Constant +/-   0.154**  -0.061   0.074 
   (2.08) (-0.51)  (1.02) 
NEXECD -  -0.030    0.087  -0.039 
  (-0.80)   (1.51) (-1.21) 
BIG4 -  -0.050***  -0.046***  -0.030*** 
  (-3.55) (-3.31) (-2.97) 
EXECOWN +/-  -0.037**   0.032  -0.025* 
  (-2.54)  (1.35) (-1.82) 
LARGHOLD +/-  -0.031   0.025  -0.049 
  (-1.11)  (0.48) (-0.98) 
BODSIZE -   0.050   0.282   0.077 
   (0.47)  (1.59)  (0.67) 
CEODUAL +   0.004   0.012   0.007 
   (0.32)  (0.55)  (0.48) 
AUDCOM -  -0.013   0.046*  -0.006 
  (-0.90)  (1.94) (-0.40) 
AUDTEN -  -0.079***  -0.031  -0.053*** 
  (-3.20) (-1.13) (-3.19) 
LEV +   0.023   0.001   0.050 
   (0.84)  (0.02)  (0.88) 
SIZE -  -0.000  -0.010  -0.001 
  (-0.00) (-1.19) (-0.26) 
∆CFO -   0.057*  -0.044  -0.052* 
   (1.65) (-0.67) (-1.70) 
SMOOTH -  -0.053***  -0.122***  -0.042*** 
  (-3.39) (-4.68) (-3.09) 
ASSINT +  -1.004 -11.216**  -0.527 
  (-0.43)  (-2.44) (-0.30) 
ABSNI +   0.412***    0.417***    0.221*** 
   (7.20)   (8.75)   (3.22) 
Time dummies? Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 303 264 438 
Adj. R
2
   0.2592    0.2960    0.1393 
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difference between pre-managed earnings, measured as reported earnings minus discretionary accruals 
generated from different discretionary accruals models, and firm’s earnings benchmark, measured as 
firm earnings in the prior year, taking the value of 1 when pre-managed earnings are above earnings 
benchmark, and zero otherwise, ASSINT= the ratio of gross fixed assets to total market capitalisation, 
ABSDNI = the absolute value of net income scaled by lagged total assets. 
 
 
